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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT

COUNTY OF ALBANY

In the Matter of the Application of
JOSEPH COMFORT, #82-C-0273,

Petitioner,
DECISION AND ORDER
INDEXNO. 3299-17

For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 of the
Civil Practice Law and Rules

-againstNEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE,
. TINA STANFO~, CHAIRWOMAN
Respondent.

APPEARANCES:

NEW YORK STATE DEFENDERS ASSOCIATION
Attorneys for Petitioner
(Alfred O'Connor, Esq. of Counsel)
194 \VashingtonAvenue, Suite 500
Albany, New York 12210
HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN
Attorney General of the State of New York
Attorneys for Respondent
(Brian W. Matula, Esq., AAG of Counsel)
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224

KOWEEK,J.:
Petitioner commenced the instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding challenging respondent's
determination which denied his application for parole release and held him for an additional 24
month period.
Petitioner is in the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and
Community Services (DOCCS) serving a1,1 indeterminate term of imprisonment. The petitioner
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. was convicted of the crimes of Murder in the Second Degree, Attempted Murder in the Second
Degree, Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance in the First Degree and Criminal Possession of
a Cont~olled Substance in the First Degree. The convictiohs resulted in an incident where the
petitioner and his brother engaged in a shootout with two undercover New York State police
officers during an undercover cocaine investigation. Petitioner fired a weapon at the officers,
killing one and seriously injuring the other. On April 20, 1982, the petitioner was sentenced to an
indeterminate term of 331/:i years to life.
The petitioner appeared before the Parole Board for his second parole hearing on October
11, 2016. After the interview, the Board issued its decision denying petitioner's release and
ordered petitioner held for 24 months. The Panel concluded:
The Panel notes your personal growth and productive use of time, however,
discretionary release shall not be granted merely as a reward for good
conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined. After carefully
reviewing your record and conducting a De Novo interview, parole is denied.
YoU;stand convicted of the serious offense of murder second, attempted
murder second, criminal possession of a controlled substance frrst and
criminal sale of a controlled substance first, in. connection with your
actions during a shootout, killing a[n] undercover officer and seriously
wounding another undercover officer, that is a continuation of your ·
criminal history, which includes Family Court history.
The Panel makes note of your program goals and accomplishments,
including your completion of Aggression Replacement Therapy and
vocatfonal work, risk and needs assessment and your overall good
disciplinary record. Also, your release plans, letters of support, significant
official and community opposition, and sentencing minutes have been
reviewed and considered. Despite your low risk scores ori Criminal
Offender Management Profile for Alternatives for Sanctions Risk Assessment,
you demonstrated shallow remorse to the Panel and focused on your desire
to be released.
·
After deliberating, reviewing your overall record, and statutoiy factors,
discretionary release is not presently warranted, as your release would trivialize
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· the tragic loss of life tKat you caused and, furthermore, would be
incompatible with the welfare of society and would so deprecate the
serious nature of your crimes as to undermine respect for the law.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with the Division of Parole Appea.ls Unit on February

.

16, 2017. On March 22, 2017, the appeal was denied by the respondent. Petitioner now brings
this CPLR Article 78 proceeding.
Initially, the petitioner alleges the Board failed to comply with Executive Law § 259-c(4)
which requires the Board to use procedures to measure an inmate's rehabilitation and the
likelihood of succe~s upon release. The petitioner maintains his parole denial should be vacated.

In 2011, Ex~cutive Law§ 259-c(4) was amended to require the Board to ''establish
written procedures for its use in making parole decisions" and to consider the person's likelihood
of success upon release to parole supervision. Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c) was amended to
consolidate into one section the complete list of factors the Board is required to consider in
evaluating applications for parole release. The amendments to Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c)
became effective in administrative hearings conducted on-or after October 1, 2011:
Petitioner's parole release interview was subject to the requirements of Executive Law§·
259-c(4). The petitioner alleges the decision of the Board was irrational and did not consider all
of the requirements' of Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c). (Matter of Thwaites v. New York State
Board of Parole, 34 Misc3d 694 [Sup. Ct. 2011]).
A review of the record indicates the Board considered the requirements of the Executive
Law relating to parole release. The amendments to Executive Law 259-i(2)(c) did not result in a
substantiative change in the criteria which the Parole Board should consider.in rendering its
decisions. (Montane v. Evans, 116 AD3d 197 [3d Dept. 2014]).). TJµs Cou1t finds the factors that
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· must be considered for release on parole were adequately considered here. The record does not
demonstrate that the Parole Board failed to consider the statuto1y factors set forth in Executive
Law§ 259-i(2)(c). (Goldberg v. New York State Board of Parole, 103 AD3d 634 [2d Dept.
2013)].
Parole release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statuto1y requirements,
'will not be disturbed. (Matter of Neal v. Stanford, 131AD3d1320 [3d Dept. 2015]). If the Parole
Board's decision is made in accordance with the statutory requirements, the Board's
determination is not subject to judicial review. (Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Division
of Parole, 119 AD3d 1268 [3d Dept. 2014]). Furthermore, only a "showing of irrationality
bordering on impropriety" on the part of the Parole Board has been found to necessitate judicial
intervention. (Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470 [2000]; Matter of Russo v. New York
State Board of Parole, 50 NY2d 69 [1980]). In the absence of the above, there is no basis upon
which to disturb the discretionaiy determination made by the Parole Board. (Matter of Delacruz
v. Annucci, 122 AD3d.1413 [4'h Dept. 2014]). With these principles in mind, the Court turns to
the merits of petitioner's case.
Petitioner argues the decision to deny him parole was irrational, arbitrary and capricious,
and resulted in a gross abuse of discretion. A Board's determination denying parole release will
not'be disturbed unless there is a "showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety" (Matter of
Silmon v. Travis, 95 NY2d at 476). The Court finds the Parole Board considered the relevant
factors in making its decision and its determination was supported by the record. The decision
was sufficient to apprise petitioner of the reasons for the denial of discretionary release. A
review of the trans~ript of the parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offenses,
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attention was paid to such factors as petitioner's institutional programming and his plans upon
release. He was given an opp01tunity to make a statement in support of his release. The Board
also had petitioner's sentencing minutes, Inmate Status Report, Pre-Sentence Investigation
Report, a COMP AS Reentiy Risk Assessment and a COMP AS Case Plan which details.·.
petitioner's institutional adjustment, programming, disciplinaiy record, proposed release plans,
criminal history, risk factors and the facts of the current offense. Petitioner claims his COMPAS
risks levels were low. Co11tra1y to petitioner's claim, the COMP AS assessment is but one

or

many documents the Board now considers when making its parole release decisions. (Matter of
Thomas v. Evans, 109 AD3d 1069 [3d Dept. 2013]). While the Board must consider the
conclusion reached through use of the COMP AS assessment, it may draw a different conclusion
regarding the risks posed by the petitioner's release. (Matter of Rivera v. New York State
Division of Parole, 119 AD3d 1107 [3d Dept. 2014]).
The Court notes the Board was free to place emphasis on th.e seriousness of petitioner's
instant offenses. (Matter of Montalvo

v. New York State Board of Parole, 50 AD3d 1438 [3d

Dept. 2008]). The Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor
that it considered in determining the inmate's application, or to expressly diScuss each one.
(Matter of Vigliotti v. State of New York Executive Division of Parole, 98 AD3d 789.[3d Dept.
2012]; (Matter of Wise v New York State Division of Parole, 54 AD3d 463 [3d Dept. 2008]).
'

The determination ls not rendered improper by the Parole Board's failure to "expressly discuss
each of these guidelines in its determination" (Matter of King v. New York State Division of
Parole, 83 NY2d 788 [1994]).
Executive Law§ 259-i(2) does not grant parole release merely as a reward for
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petitioner's good conduct or achievements while incarcerated. (Matter of Mentor v. New York
State Division of Parole, 87 AD3d 1245 [3d Dept. 2011]). The Court finds it was not irrational
for the Board to place more weight on instant offenses than petitioner's institutional
accomplishments and plans for release. (Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Division of
Parole, 119 AD3d at 1273-1274). Petitioner has failed to meet his burden showing the Board
did not consider the relevant statutory factors or that the decision was irrational, arbitrary,
capricious or contrary to law.
Petitioner's conclusionmy allegation that the Board's decision was predisposed to
denying him release is without merit. (Matter of Connelly v. New York State Division of Parole,
286 AD2d 792 [3d Dept. 2001], appeal dismissed 97 NY2d 677 [2001]). ln addition, petitioner's
allegations of bias on the pait of the Board are not supported by the record and petitioner failed to
offer proof that the .outcome of this case flowed from the alleged bias. (Matter of Hernandez v.
McSherrv, 271 AD2d 777 [3d Dept. 2000], Iv denied 95 NY2d 769 [2001]). The Parole Board is
required to consider the same factors each time the petitioner appears for· a parole release hearing.
(Matter of Williams v. New York State Division of Parole, 70 AD3d 1106 [3d Dept. 2010[, Iv
· denied 17 NY3d 7Q9 [201 OJ). The record discloses the Bom·d rendered its determination after
considering the full record, including the hearmg testimony, the petitioner's institutional
background, his.achievements, his criminal histo1y and release pians. (Matter ofMarziak v.
Alexander, 62 AD3d 1227 [3dDept. 2009]; Matter ofSalahuddin v. Dermison, 34 AD3d 1082
[3'd Dept. 2006]).
Petitioner's Claim that he was denied due process has been examined and found to be
without merit. Executive Law§ 259-i, does not create an entitlement to release on parole and
6

·therefore does not create interests entitled to due process. (l'aunetto v. Hammock, 516 F. Supp
1367 [US Dist. Ct., SDNY, 1981]). There is no due process right to parole. (Russo v. New York
. State Board of Parole, 50 NY2d at 73). Also, there is no due process right for an inmate to obtain
a statement as to what he should do to improve his chances for parole in the future. (Matter of
Francis v. New York State Division of Parole, 89 AD3d 1312 [3d Dept. 2005]). Nor does the
denial of parole constitute double jeopardy. (Matter of Patterson v. Goord, 1AD3d845 [3d Dept.
2003)). Petitioner's allegation that the denial of parole was akin to re-sentencing is without
merit. (Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 AD3d 1320 [3d Dept. 2011)). Moreover, where the action
under review does not involve a suspect class or fundamental right, it is not subject to strict
judicial scrntiny, but is examined using a rational basis standard to determine ifthe action
violated the equal protection clause. (Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 US 307
[1976); Maresca v. Cuomo, 64 NY2d 242 [1984]).
Petitioner maintains the Board should not have considered community opposition to.his
parole release. Petitioner claims the New York State Troopers Benevolent Association solicited
the public to submit letters in opposition to petitioner's parole release. The petitioner claims the
Benevolent Association sought help from the public "to ensure Comfort is denied parole and kept
in prison, where he belongs." Petitioner contends Executive Law 259-i does not allow the Board
to consider opposition statements from the public. Petitioner claims the statements from the
public may contain erroneous information that should not have been considered by the Board.
The petitioner has not alleged or demonstrated that the Board considered any erroneous
letters or emails from the public that influenced their decision in denying parole release.
Petitioner's allegation that the Board may have considered erroneous information supplied by
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public opposition is merely speculative. It would not be unusua\ for the Trooper Benevolent
Association to 0ppose parole release of those inmates who have been convicted of the murder of
a trooper or police officer. The Board may receive and consider written communications from
individuals, other than those specifically identified in Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A)
(victims/families), in: opposing an inmate's release to parole supervision. (Matter of Grigger, 11
AD3d 850 [3d Dept. 2004], Iv denied 4 NY3d 704 [2015]), 9 NYCRR § 8000.5(c)(2)provides in
part that "it is essential ' . ' to permit private citizens to express freely their opinions for or
against an individual's parole", The allegation that the Board considered erroneous information
provided by community opposition is unfounded, The petitioner was denied parole release for
reasons other than community opposition, (Matter of Ebbs v, Regan, 54 AD2d 611 [4th Dept.
1976], appeal denied 40 NY2d 897 [1976]). The Parole Board denied parole release pursuant to
Executive Law § 259-i based upon the many factors discussed herein.
Petitioner's allegation that the Board has adopted a more punitive approach towards
convicted violent offenders is also unfounded. Courts have consistently rejected unsupported
allegations that the Board merely effectuates an informal executive policy when it denied parole .
· release to violent offenders, (Matter of MacKenzie v. Dennison, 55 AD3d 1092 [3d Dept. 2008]),
Moreover, a review of the record reveals that petitioner's 'speculative and conclusionary assertion
that the denial of parole was influenced by political or media pressures is unpersuasive, @fatter
of Allah v, Pataki, 15 AD3d 810 [3d Dept. 2005], appeal dismissed 5 NY3d 780 [2005]),
The record discloses the Board rendered its determination after considering the full
'record, inclu,ding t~e hearing testimony, the petitioner's institutional background, his
achievements, his criminal history and his release plans. (Matter of Marziak v, Alexander, 62

8

AD3d 1227 [3d Dept. 2009)). Petitioner's allegation that the denial of parole was akin to resentencing is without merit. (Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 AD3d 1320 [3d Dept. 2011]). In
addition, the Board's decision to hold the petitioner for the maximum 24 months is within the
Board's discretion and was supported by the record. (see, Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(a); Matter of
Campbell v. Evans, 106 AD3d 1363 [3d Dept. 2013)).
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was in accordance with the statutmy
requirements and was not excessive, irrational, arbitrary, capricious or in violation oflawful
procedure. (Matter of Russo v. New York State Board of Parole, 50 NY2d at 77).
The Court has reviewed the parties remaining contentions and concludes they either lack
merit or are unpersuasive given the Court's determination. (Hubbard v County of Madison, 71
AD3d 1313 [3d Dept. 201 OJ).
Accordingly, the petition is hereby denied.
The original Decision, Order and Judgment is being returned to the attorneys for
respondent. The_ signing of this Decision, Order and Judgment shall not constitute entry or filing
under CPLR 2220. All original supporting documentation is being sent to the Albany County
Clerk's Office. Counsel are not relieved from the applicable provisions of that rule relating to
filing, entry, and notice of ent1y.
This is the Decision and Order of this Court.
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DATED: October ')._,
2017
Hudson, New York

. CHARD M. KOWEEK
Acting Supreme Court Justice
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Papers Considered:

1.

Notice of Petition dated May 22, 2017; Verified Petition dated May 15, 2017 with
annexed exhibits A-0; Memorandum of Law undated;

2.

Verified Answer dated July 21, 2017 with annexed exhibits A-L; Memorandum of Law
dated July 24, 2017.

3.

Reply conespondence of Alfred O'Connor, Esq. dated August 10, 2017 with annexed
exhibits.
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